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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nikolas Lee Sherman appeals from the conviction entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a prescription medication. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A Post Falls resident contacted police after finding an intoxicated male on 
his property. (R., p.9.) Upon the arrival of the responding officer, the intoxicated 
individual tried to flee the area by jumping over a fence, but he was restrained by 
the officer. (Id.) The individual, who identified himself as "Zach Wilhelm," told 
the officer he was being chased and was in fear for his safety. (Id.) The officer 
asked the man if he had anything on his person that he needed to be aware of, 
and the man responded, "I have one of my friend['s] prescriptions on me that is 
aiL" (Id.) 
The officer retrieved two prescription pill bottles from the man's pockets. 
(R., p.9) One bottle identified its contents as Hydrocodone prescribed to 
"Kenneth Gallegos," and the other as Clorazapam prescribed to "Nickolas 
Sherman." (Id.) The officer also retrieved a wallet from the man, the contents of 
which identified him as Nikolas Sherman. (Id.) Sherman told the officer that he 
had been with a friend earlier in the day and that "she" left the pills with him. (Id.) 
The officer then cited and arrested Sherman for misdemeanor unlawful 
possession of prescription medication, I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). (Id.) 
The officer then made contact with the residence of Kenneth Gallegos. 
(R., p.9.) Gallegos reported that he had left his vehicle parked outside his 
1 
residence unlocked, but was not sure whether he left his Hydrocodone bottle 
inside. (Id.) The officer observed Sherman's vehicle parked nearby. (R., p.10.) 
A neighbor told the officer that Sherman had recently been in the area. (Id.) 
At the police station, after being advised of his Miranda rights, Sherman 
changed his story and told police that he was playing Frisbee golf with Zach 
Wilhelm earlier in the day, and that it was Wilhelm who asked Sherman to hold 
the Hydrocodone medication that was prescribed to Gallegos. (Id.) Sherman 
denied stealing the pills from the vehicle parked outside the Gallegos' residence. 
(Id.) 
Sherman filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful possession of prescription 
medication charge, arguing that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) violated constitutional 
SUbstantive due process, both on its face and as applied to him. (R., pp.18-20, 
22-25.) The parties stipulated to admit the police report of the incident for the 
court's consideration of the motion. (Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.17.) No other 
evidence was presented. (See Tr., p.1, L.1 - p.22, L.3.) After a hearing, the 
magistrate court denied Sherman's motion. (R., pA8; Tr., p.1, L.1 - p.22, L.3.) 
Sherman then filed a motion to reconsider the magistrate court's denial of 
his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.50-53.) At a hearing, the magistrate court declined 
to revisit its prior ruling, but invited argument on a separate issue that had been 
tangentially raised at a prior hearing - whether the jury should be instructed on 
I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f), which excepts "warehousemen" from certain criminal 
provisions of the Idaho Pharmacy Act. (Tr., p.24, L.18 - p.25, L.8.) Specifically, 
Sherman requested that the court provide an instruction that would omit the term 
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"warehousemen," but "would say something along the lines ... if [Sherman] was 
simply holding [the prescription medication] for another person ... then he would 
not necessarily be guilty of the crime." (Tr., p.25, L.9 - p.26, L.6.) The 
magistrate court declined to give this instruction, ruling that the I.C. § 54-
1734(2)(f) "warehousemen" exception required Sherman to present evidence that 
he performed such warehousing for compensation, or was somehow otherwise 
"in the business" of warehousing prescription drugs, and that Sherman had failed 
to present such evidence. (Tr., p.27, L. 12 - p.28, L.22.) 
Sherman then entered a conditional guilty plea to misdemeanor unlawful 
possession of prescription medication, preserving his right to appeal the 
magistrate court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and its order declining to 
instruct the jury on the I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f) "warehousemen" exception. (R., p.38; 
Tr., p.32, L.15 - p.35, L.12.) The magistrate court imposed 180 days jail with 
174 suspended, with Sherman to serve 16 hours on the sheriff's labor program in 
lieu of six days jail. (R., p.39; Tr., p.37, Ls.3-8.) The magistrate court also 
imposed a fine and two years unsupervised probation. (R., p.39.) 
Sherman appealed to the district court. (R., ppAO-43.) In its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the magistrate court's denial of 
Sherman's motion to dismiss, and its denial of Sherman's motion to instruct the 
jury on the "warehouseman" defense. (R., pp.85-95.) The district court held that 
the magistrate court erred in concluding that the I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f) 
"warehousemen" exception required Sherman to present evidence that he was in 
the "business" of warehousing, but that Sherman was still not entitled to the 
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instruction because he failed to present evidence that he was storing the 
prescription medication at the direction of the individual who actually possessed 
the prescription. (R., pp.93-94.) Sherman timely appealed. (R., pp.96-99.) 
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ISSUES 
Sherman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is on its face a violation of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
2. Whether I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is as applied to the facts in this 
case in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
3. Whether the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction that 
it would be a defense to a charge of possessing a 
prescription drug without a prescription under I.C. § 54-
1732(3)(c) to merely be a person storing that legend drug for 
another and has no control over its disposition beside [sic] 
that storage. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Sherman failed to show that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) violates substantive 
due process on its face or as applied to him? 
2. Has Sherman failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate court's decision not to instruct the jury on the I.C. § 54-
1734(2)(f) "warehousemen" exception? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Sherman Failed To Show That I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) Violates Substantive Due 
Process On Its Face Or As Applied To Him 
A. Introduction 
Sherman contends that the magistrate and district court erred in rejecting 
his constitutional substantive due process challenge to I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c). 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-22.) He claims that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is 
unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. (ld.) However, because 
I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) bears a reasonable relationship to the permissible legislative 
objective of the promotion and protection of the public health and welfare, 
Sherman has failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." bi. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
6 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." kt (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )). 
The meaning and effect of a statute, including the statute's 
constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827,829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). "The party 
attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity." State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 430, 179 P.3d 1084, 
1086 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 
131 (2003)). "Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute 
that upholds constitutionality." kt 
C. Idaho Code § 54-1732(3)(c) Does Not Violate Substantive Due Process, 
Either On Its Face Or As Applied To Sherman 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." The concept of substantive due process has 
been understood to embody the requirement that a statute bear a reasonable 
relationship to a permissible legislative objective. State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 
167, 686 P.2d 842, 847 (Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted). 
In order to prevail on a substantive due process claim, the state action that 
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must be arbitrary, capricious, or 
without a rational basis. Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 586, 726 P.2d 693, 698 
(1986). Conversely, a substantive due process violation will not be found if the 
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state action "bear[s] a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative 
objective." In re McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 189, 804 P.2d 911, 918 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Reed, 107 Idaho at 167, 686 P.2d at 847.) 
"Legislative acts that do not impinge on fundamental rights or employ 
suspect classifications are presumed valid, and this presumption is overcome 
only by a 'clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.'" Kawaoka v. City of 
Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, "in a substantive 
due process challenge, [the courts] do not require that the [government's] 
legislative acts actually advance its stated purposes, but instead look to whether 
'the governmental body could have had no legitimate reason for its decision.'" kL 
(citations omitted). Additionally, "[i]f it is 'at least fairly debatable' that the 
[government's] conduct is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, 
there has been no violation of substantive due process." Halverson V. Skagit 
County, 42 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Kawaoka, 17 F.3d at 1234). 
The statute Sherman challenges in this case, I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c), 
proscribes "[t]he possession or use of a legend drug or a precursor by any 
person unless such person obtains such drug on the prescription or drug order of 
a practitioner." At the time of Sherman's charged conduct, I.C. § 54-1705(32)1 
defined "prescription drug order," in relevant part, as a "lawful written or verbal 
order of a practitioner for a drug or device for an ultimate user of the drug or 
device, issued and signed by a practitioner." Thus, I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) does not 
1 As of July 31, 2013, the definition of "prescription drug order" is now codified at 
I.C. § 54-1705(35), and provides that '''Prescription drug order' means a valid 
order of a practitioner for a drug or device for an ultimate user of the drug or 
device." 2013 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 28. 
8 
prohibit individuals from possessing medications prescribed for others as long as 
that individual obtains the drugs through a valid prescription "for" an ultimate user 
of the drug (e.g., an individual may lawfully pick up prescribed medication at a 
pharmacy for another). 
The express legislative purpose of the Idaho Pharmacy Act, which 
contains I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c), is: 
to promote, preserve and protect the health, safety and welfare of 
the public by and through the effective control and regulation of the 
practice of pharmacy and of the registration of drug outlets 
engaged in the manufacture, production, sale and distribution of 
drugs, medications, devices and such other materials as may be 
used in the diagnosis and treatment of injury, illness and disease 
I.C. § 54-1703. The promotion and protection of public health and welfare is a 
permissible legislative objective. Van Orden v. State, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, 102 Idaho 663, 667, 637 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1981) ("The State 
legislature, under the broad concept of police power, may enact laws concerning 
the health, safety and welfare of the people so long as the regulations are not 
arbitrary or unreasonable.") 
Idaho Code § 54-1732(3)(c)'s regulation of prescription medication 
possession, as applied to Sherman, is reasonably related to the state's legitimate 
interest in promoting and protecting public health and welfare. Permitting 
individuals to possess only those prescription medications that they obtained 
through licensed and regulated practitioners, and through lawful prescription drug 
orders, mitigates the potential for prescription drug misuse and abuse. The fact 
that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) covers conduct that Sherman personally considers 
innocuous (i.e. Sherman's possession of another individual's prescription 
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medication, which Sherman claims to have obtained through a third individual), 
speaks to his disagreement with the legislature's policy determinations rather 
than to substantive due process. Sherman cannot meet the high burden to show 
that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c), as applied to his conduct, has no rational relationship to 
any legitimate state interest. 
While conceding the state has a legitimate interest in "stopping the misuse 
and abuse of prescription drugs," Sherman contends on appeal that "[t]o justify 
this law the state would need [to] show that the population of the state of Idaho, 
aside from those employed in the pharmaceutical industry, is so disposed as to 
misuse and abuse any medication of which it comes into possession." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) To the contrary, it is not the state's burden to show 
that I.C § 54-1732(3)(c), as applied to Sherman, constitutes the least restrictive 
means of furthering the state's legitimate interest, or that the entire Idaho 
population is susceptible to prescription drug abuse. Instead, it is Sherman's 
burden to overcome a strong presumption of validity and show that I.C. § 54-
1732(3)(c), as applied to his conduct in this case, does not bear even a 
reasonable relationship to the state's legitimate interest. See McNeely, 119 
Idaho at 189, 804 P.2d at 918. Sherman has failed to make such a showing. 
Because I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is constitutional as applied to Sherman, it is 
also facially constitutional. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, 
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. 
The fact that [an Act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable 
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set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid .... " United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Because there are circumstances, including 
his own in this case, in which I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) operates constitutionally, 
Sherman has failed to show that I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is unconstitutional on its 
face. 
Idaho Code § 54-1732(3)(c) is rationally related to the state's legitimate 
public health and safety interest. Sherman has therefore failed to establish that 
I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him. He has 
therefore failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
II. 
Sherman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Affirming The 
Magistrate Court's Decision Not To Instruct The Jury On The I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f) 
"Warehousemen" Exception 
A. Introduction 
Sherman contends that the district court erred in declining his request to 
instruct the jury on I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f), which excepts "warehousemen" from 
certain provisions of the Idaho Pharmacy Act. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-25.) A 
review of the record reveals that Sherman was not entitled to his requested 
instruction because he failed to present facts sufficient to support it. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As discussed above, on review of a decision rendered by a district court in 
its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the 
district court's decision." DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217 (citing 
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Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758. The appellate court "examine[s] the 
magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent 
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's 
conclusions of law follow from those findings." kL. "If those findings are so 
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed 
the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure." kL. (citing Losser, 145 Idaho at 670; 
Nicholls, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137. 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78 
(2010); State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370,372,64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002). Whether a 
reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial 
court's discretion. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32,951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State 
v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874,878,920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996). 
C. Sherman Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence To Support The 
Requested Instruction 
To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant 
must "present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] 
defense." State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
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not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 
P.2d 578, 581 (1996). "When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in 
accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing 
court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 
191,824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted). 
When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended it to mean. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009). To determine that intent, the appellate court examines not only the 
literal words of the state, but also the reasonableness of the proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 19.: 
In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute "effect must give given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108,109,138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006). 
In this case, Sherman requested that the magistrate court instruct the jury 
on I.C. § 54-1734(2)(f), which excepts "warehousemen" from certain provisions of 
the Idaho Pharmacy Act. The relevant portions of I.C. § 54-1734 provide: 
The provisions of this chapter pertaining to the sale of 
prescription drugs are not applicable: 
(1) To the sale of legend drugs to persons included in any of the 
classes named in paragraphs (a) through (f) in subsection 
(2) of this section, or to the agents or employees of such 
persons, for use in the usual and lawful course of their 
business or practice or in the performance of their lawful 
official duties, as the case may be; or 
(2) To the possession of legend drugs by such person or their 
agents or employees for such use: 
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(f) Carriers and warehousemen. 
Idaho Code § 54-1705(36)2 defined "warehouseman" as "a person who 
stores legend drugs for others and who has no control over the disposition of 
such drugs except for the purpose of such storage." 
Thus, "warehousemen" and their agents and employees are lawfully 
permitted to possess legend drugs only "for such use." The term "for such use" 
refers back to I.C. § 54-1734(1), which permits the sale of prescription drugs by 
warehousemen or other qualified individuals, "for use in the usual and lawful 
course of their business or practice or in the performance of their lawful official 
duties, as the case may be." 
The district court correctly affirmed the magistrate court's denial of 
Sherman's motion to instruct the jury on the "warehousemen" exception, because 
Sherman failed to "present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
relevant to [the] defense." See Camp, 134 Idaho at 665-66, 8 P.3d at 660-61. 
As the district court concluded, even if this exception did not, by its plain 
language, require Sherman to be employed or economically involved in the 
business of warehousing prescription medication, it did require Sherman to, at 
the very least, make a showing that he was storing the drug "for" someone who 
had a legal right to possess it. (R., pp.93-94.) Further, Sherman was required to 
present evidence that he stored the drug for a permissible use, i.e., "in the usual 
2 As of July 31,2013, the definition of "warehousemen" is now codified at I.C. § 
54-1705(39). 2013 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 28. The statutory definition itself 
was not modified. 
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and lawful course of [his] business or practice or in the performance of [his] 
lawful official duties," as required by I.C. § 54-1734. Additionally, Sherman was 
not entitled to assert the "warehousemen" exception defense because he did not 
present evidence that he lacked "control over the disposition of such drugs 
except for the purpose of such storage," as required by I.C. § 54-1705(36). 
Finally, to the extent the statutory language regarding the "warehousemen" 
exception is ambiguous, it is clear that the legislative intent behind I.C. §§ 54-
1705(36) and 1734 was not to exempt from criminal liability individuals, such as 
Sherman, who held prescription drugs for other individuals, who in turn 
possessed those drugs without a valid prescription. 
In support of his argument that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the 
"warehousemen" exception, Sherman relied on the police report, which indicated 
that Sherman told police that he was asked to hold the Hydrocodone by a friend, 
Zach Wilhelm. (R., pp.9-10.) However, the police report contains no explanation 
as to how Wilhelm may have obtained the drugs from Kenneth Gallegos, to 
whom the drugs were actually prescribed. (See id.) 
Sherman therefore failed to present any evidence that his storage of the 
drugs came "in the usual and lawful course of [his] business or practice," or in the 
performance of any "lawful official duties." Sherman did not attempt to establish 
that his storage of the drugs occurred in the course of any business, practice, or 
official duties, or even that he was holding the drugs at the direction of the 
individual for whom the drugs were lawfully prescribed. Sherman also did not 
attempt to show that he "lacked control over the disposition of the drugs except 
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for the purposes of such storage." In fact, because Sherman's storage of the 
drugs was in no way authorized, licensed, or regulated by the Idaho Pharmacy 
Act, he enjoyed total control of the disposition of the drugs. 
Further, if the language of l. C. §§ 54-1705(36) and 1734(2)(f) is 
ambiguous, it is clear that the legislative intent behind these provisions is not to 
exempt from criminal liability individuals who hold prescription drugs for other 
individuals, who in turn possessed those drugs without a valid prescription. The 
Idaho Pharmacy Act contains the legislative declaration that the practice of 
pharmacy in the state of Idaho is a "professional practice," that is subject to 
"regulation and control in the public interest." I.C. § 54-1702. It is consistent with 
this purpose to exempt licensed and regulated pharmacists, practitioners, 
hospitals, warehousemen, and others - who operate within the "business or 
practice" of pharmacy - from criminal provisions proscribing the possession of 
prescription drugs. On the other hand, it is inconsistent with this purpose to 
permit unlicensed and unregulated individuals, such as Sherman, to qualify for 
the "warehousemen" exception simply through their "storage" of prescription 
medications for other individuals, who themselves lacked a valid prescription for 
the medication. Sherman's contrary interpretation would essentially render I.e. § 
54-1732(3)(c) superfluous, and permit the possession of any prescription drugs 
by any individual so long as they were not obtained in a manner that violated 
some other statute related to theft or fraud. 
Sherman failed to present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
relevant to his proposed defense that he was exempt from criminal liability 
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pursuant to the "warehousemen" exception. He has therefore failed to show that 
the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's denial of his motion to 
so instruct the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order affirming Sherman's conviction for unlawful possession of a prescription 
medication. 
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